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 Identity negotiation has a limited scope constrained by pre-existing memories of 
identification and political and economic circumstances. It is often motivated by 
the contexts in which the individuals and the collectivities find themselves in, 
especially under the condition of rapid socio-political change. Presumed common 
ancestry, history, language, religion and custom can be considered the raw 
materials of identity construction (Nagel 1994; Cornell 1996; Schlee 2007). They 
either inform or constrain the processes of identification of an individual or 
collectivity. However, since the publication of Barth’s (1969) seminal book, 
Ethnic groups and boundaries, the focus of investigation of the scholars of 
ethnicity and identity has changed from the totality of the ‘objective’ features of a 
group or groups to a selection of the actors’ most significant features in a given 
situation. In the same line of argument, in this thesis, I attempted to show how the 
ethnic actors negotiate and (re)construct their identity by selectively emphasizing 
and de-emphasizing the raw materials of identification in different contexts within 
the given options. Actors use the most relevant identity markers at a certain 
moment, which could be inversed in another situation. They strategically and 
inventively ‘remember’ or ‘forget’ the markers of identification. However, not all 
the groups and individuals have equal raw materials of identifications, nor can 
they all be used strategically and selectively in the construction of identity. Even 
though a lot of calculations, negotiations and selection of raw-materials of 
identification – and even (re)construction and invention – have been taken into 
account in the choice making processes, the construction of identity is not 
arbitrary. Identity constructions ‘never occur in a vacuum’ (Cornell and Hartmann 
1998: 197).  
The research on which the thesis is based was designed as a response to the 
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rapid political changes, violent conflicts and the recent institutionalization of 
ethnicity in Ethiopia, and the explosion of ethnicity discourse in general. The main 
question the dissertation set to answer was how individuals and collectivities 
decide their belonging or construct their identities within the available range of 
options of identifications, in varying circumstances. I use ‘identification’ as a 
process of claiming belonging to broader ethnic groups or ethno-national states 
and even national states. ‘Belonging’ here is less about emotion than about 
historical, cultural, and the perceived advantages one would get through belonging 
to one of the ethno-national groups or national states.  
My data came from the Borana, Gabra and Garri. The Borana, Gabra and 
Garri are located at the triangular borders of the three states in Northeast Africa – 
Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. In ethnic and linguistic terms, they are at the 
boundary of two major ethnic groups of the Horn of Africa: Somali and Oromo. 
All the three groups speak Afaan Oromo; and most of the Garri and an 
insignificant number of the Gabra also speak Somali.  Potentially, but not equally, 
the Borana, Gabra and Garri could identify with any one of these nationalisms: 
state, ethnic or linguistic. Though I examined different historical circumstances, 
emphasis has been given to how the Borana, Gabra and Garri took sides and 
constructed identity in the context of conflicts such as Ethiopia-Somalia war of the 
1960s and 1970s, and to the recent ethno-national identity politics where ethnicity 
is a formal organizing principle of the administrative structure in Ethiopia.   
 In both contexts, the national states (Somalia and Ethiopia, and to less extent 
Kenya) and the broader ethnic groups (Somali and Oromo) posed claims over the 
Borana, Gabra and Garri. The actors among the Borana, Gabra and Garri have 
also engaged in negotiations, claims and counter claims. These negotiations, 
claims, counter-claims and resistances were mostly framed in ethno-national 
terms. In such instances, these peripheral groups: the Borana, Gabra and Garri, 
were forced to take sides and construct belonging to one of the broader ethno-
national groups or national states. I emphasize the process of identification at 
micro-levels in response to the actions at the macro-structure such as rapid 
changes in state policies, ethno-national movements and national and international 
politics, which have often been accompanied by conflicts. During such moments, 
the Borana, Gabra and Garri have had to (re)construct their identity within the 
given context either by accepting or resisting the categorization by the more 
powerful actors such as the state/s and ethno-nationalists. I found myself intrigued 
by the questions such as how do people identify themselves, and are categorized 
by others? How emerging nationalisms have impacted on the shaping and 
reshaping of identification processes at the local levels. What are the rationales for 
taking sides in a conflict situation? 
  





The Past in the Present Narratives 
I started the presentation of my ethnographic work, in the second chapter, by 
examining the present narratives of the Borana, Gabra and Garri in the forms of 
myths of origin, fission, history of migration, (re)constitution and different kinds 
of historical inter-group relations. I reconstructed the identification process of the 
past to the extent that it is made relevant by actors in the identity politics of the 
present. How people understand the past matters, because it can help understand 
how they imagine the present and, of course, the future, and act on that basis. The 
past is selectively remembered, narrated, forgotten, or even invented as a political 
resource for the actors to justify a number of contested power and resource claims 
which are currently at stake (see also Chapman et al 1989: 5; Sorenson 1993: 39-
76; Schlee and Shongolo 1995: 15-16; Triulizi 2006).  I have not examined the 
past for the sake of ‘authentic’ history per se; rather I discussed the past from the 
peoples’ point of view and my interest was how the interpretation about the past 
factors in the current identification process. My informants remembered, 
constructed and narrated the past with reference to the current political landscape 
and their interests are how the ‘recollected past’ could impact their present 
identity politics. The narratives I am (re)presenting in the thesis were made in the 
context of institutionalized ethnic-politics and heightened inter-group animosity. 
This is a moment when people around Oromo-Somali boundaries are constantly 
preoccupied with defining and redefining their identity.  
Thus, Instead of reconstructing their history by taking my own critical 
perspective, I rather highlighted how their emic understanding of their history 
informs or constrains their current struggle for identification. In other words, by 
placing the different historical narratives in the present concern of the actors, I 
examined how the historical and cultural raw materials can be instrumentalized in 
the present-day struggle to construct their historical relatedness with and 
difference from the broader ethnic groups: the Oromo and Somali and of course 
the relations among themselves.   
To this effect, I have discussed different assumed descents and claimed places 
of origins as well as different migrations. The Borana oral historians trace their 
origin to a place northeast of their present territory. According to the Borana elders, 
this place of origin is where fissions of the Oromo took place. By substantiating this 
narrative of fission and migration with the sharing of common lineages and custom 
with other Oromo groups, the Borana elders indisputably narrate their identification 
with the broader Oromo ethnic group.  
Quite differently, the Gabra and Garri claim to have migrated from Yemen. 
The Garri even trace their genealogy to Prophet Mohamed’s family. The idea of 
their origin and the story of their migration connect the Gabra and Garri to the 
region known as the Holy land of the Muslim – to the Islamic Great Tradition. 
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Whether this is authentic claim or not is a different investigation. In practice, 
however, claiming descent from a common assumed place of origin serves as a 
broad assertion of common ancestry, and denying having common place of origin 
is denying common ancestry. The broader Somali also make similar claim, 
including the genealogical relation to the family of the Prophet. For the Garri and 
Gabra, claiming relation to Arabia is today in a way claiming connection to the 
Somali, and the Garri could even trace their descent to the Somali ‘national 
genealogy’. In this regard, in the present context in Southern Ethiopia and 
northern Kenya, the Borana on the one hand and the Gabra and the Garri on the 
other hand, are signifying different ancestry. The Garri and Gabra emphasize their 
common descent and difference from the Borana.  
However, the Garri-Gabra claim of common descent had not been manifested 
until the emergence of the Somali nationalism that prompted the need to form 
alliance. They claim, interestingly, that until that time the knowledge of common 
descent had remained part of their memory through the names of clans they share 
and through their similar camel marks. On the other hand, the Gabra have a 
longstanding inter-clan custom and ritual affiliation with the Borana. They had 
been affiliated to the Borana, and even integrated into the Borana’s custom and 
resource use. They had been considered as ‘low caste Boranas’ (Donaldson-Smith 
1896 cited by Belete 1999: 20), and ‘vassals of Borana’ (Haberland 1963: 141-
148). There had been also occasions when the Gabra had taken on the Borana 
identity. As a result of this dynamic ethno-genesis – including a claimed inter-clan 
descent relationship with the Garri and inter-clan custom and ritual affiliation with 
the Borana – the Gabra are at the core of identity contestation and negotiation in 
the current politics of identification around the Oromo-Somali boundary. This 
situation gave the contemporary Gabra actors a greater degree of selectivity, but 
under enormous politico-economic constraints.  
 
Pastoral Access to Key Resources and Associated Identity 
 In the third chapter, by pausing from pursuing the strand of discussion I have 
started in the previous chapter, I emphasized on the interaction between the 
pastoral groups and individuals around pastoral resources, especially water wells. 
To fully understand the processes of identification, I argue, we need to examine 
the distribution of pastoral resources, and how the resource regimes appear in 
different cultural frames. Looking at a resource shows how the politics of identity 
relates to the day-to-day life of pastoral communities. In the later chapters I will 
emphasize the role of the elite in identification processes. In that regard this 
chapter addresses a crucial question: if the elite act within the framework of the 
states’ or ethno-nationalists’ politics of identification, how does identity politics 
give sense to the “non-elite” pastoralists? It is this question that necessitates a 





brief discussion of the pastoral resources.  
My argument in this chapter is that access to the critical resources, especially 
the scarce water wells, played a significant role in shaping the pastoral livelihood 
and interaction of the Borana, Gabra and Garri as well as in their identification 
with the broader entities. These resources are so crucial that local discourses have 
been articulated about, and wars have been fought over these wells. Formation of 
local alliances, shifting allegiances and individual switching of identity were 
shaped partly, if not only, by putting these key pastoral resources, especially the 
water wells, at the center of their imagination and decision making processes. 
Different regimes that have ruled Ethiopia have manipulated access to the same 
resources again and again in their relations with the local groups. They allocated 
wells to the groups they favored, by snatching it from the groups they considered 
as adversaries or at least as allies of their adversaries.  
 
The Emergence of Nationalisms and Politics of Identification 
Chapter four presents the intertwining of the international and the national politics 
as well as the local politics of identification. In the 1960s the young independent 
Republic of Somalia set out to unite all Somali in northeast Africa in one state. 
With this mission, it went on to claim territories in which people of Somali ethnic 
origin live from its neighbours, mainly, Ethiopia and Kenya. The Somali 
nationalists’ claims and the response from Ethiopia and Kenya resulted in 
protracted secessionist guerrilla warfare in southern and eastern Ethiopia as well 
as in northern Kenya. To win the support of the politically marginalized 
pastoralist groups, among others, the Borana, Garri and Gabra, the Somali 
nationalists evoked relatedness in terms of cultural markers and kinship relation 
and categorized all the three groups as Somali. This prompted the issue of who 
belongs to the Somali and who is not; who takes side with the Somali cause and 
who does not, and what is the criteria of taking side. The Garri readily accepted 
the categorization with the Somali on the grounds of the pre-existing raw 
materials of identifications such as assumed common descent and cultural 
markers, which they selectively used, and joined the Somali insurgents. Of course, 
the attraction by the new promises from the Somali ethno-nationalism vis-à-vis 
their fragile integration into the Ethiopian and Kenyan states should not be 
undermined.   
On the other hand, this same argument was unconvincing for the Borana, 
especially the non-Muslim Borana, who could not be persuaded to become Somali 
or to be affiliated to the Somali without any supporting raw materials – cultural 
markers, the ideology of descent and history of amicable relation. Rather, it 
evoked a longstanding history of competition and conflict over resources. In other 
words, the Borana’s categorization, i.e., external assignation as Somali by the 
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Somali was not supported by the internal definition that takes into consideration 
their pre-existing raw-materials of identifications, and thus it was unsuccessful. 
The Gabra who had the same position with the Borana at the beginning of the 
conflict, gradually changed their affiliation from the Borana to the Garri. They 
selectively and intentionally re-examined their oral histories and ‘remembered’ 
their ‘cross-cutting inter-clan relation’, as Schlee calls it, with the Garri (Schlee, 
1989). The Gabra joined the Somali insurgent movement, following the Garri, by 
denouncing their longstanding ties with the Borana and even by negatively 
interpreting those histories.  
The fact that the Borana refused and the Gabra were convinced to embrace 
Somali identity, and changed their affiliation was not only a matter of their elites’ 
entrepreneurial ability. The Borana’s refusal shows the limit of outright invention 
of belonging and solidarity. The Gabra have used the existing raw materials of 
identification strategically and selectively based on the situation at hand. They 
reoriented themselves and redefined their identity and affiliated to the Somali, by 
selectively evoking their identity markers (Barth 1969).  
The Republic of Somalia created an enabling situation for these peripheral 
groups by establishing a rebel organization – the Somali Abo Liberation Front – 
an organization that spoke the Oromo language and fought for the interest of the 
Republic of Somalia. With the Somali claim and the Ethiopian counter-claim 
clashing, eventually, Oromo nationalism emerged from within Ethiopia with yet 
another map that contradicted both the Ethiopian and the Somali claims. 
   
 Ethnic Federalism and Politics of Identification 
The dynamism of ethnicity in Ethiopia in general and the politics of identification 
among the Borana, Garri and Gabra in particular reached climax in the post 1991 
phenomena, which is discussed in chapter five.  The ethnic based federal system, 
and the role ethnicity plays as an organizing principle of the state as well as the 
ensuing political dynamism have several effects on the politics of identification. 
The most important one is that ethnicity is intertwined with resources and 
consequently ethnic identity politics have become more important than ever 
before. Resources such as state allocated budget, job opportunities, and service 
providing sectors including schools, health centers, and relief food distributions 
are channeled along the newly established ethno-national states. This has 
fundamentally impacted on the politics of identification among the Borana, Garri 
and Gabra that are situated on the boundary of Oromia and Somali national 
Regional States. Belonging to either the Oromo or Somali has become crucial for 
them, and in fact, it resulted in the creation of very talented ethnic entrepreneurs, 
especially among the Garri and Gabra.  In these circumstances, they revisited and 
strategically (re)negotiated and (re)defined their identification with the Oromo or 





Somali. But their negotiations have always been informed and constrained by the 
pre-existing history of relatedness and differences which they selectively 
emphasized and deemphasized in response to the new political and economic 
incentives. For the Borana who have better pastoral resource under their control 
and have indisputable connection to the broader Oromo, the current process of 
identification is shaped by the new political dynamism, which activated the 
historical memories including common assumed descent and customs with the 
broader Oromo, and the image of the strong enemy other: the Somali.  
As Mentioned above, the Garri were not only aware of their Somali identity 
but also fought against Ethiopia and Kenya under the banner of Somali 
nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s. However, this has not hindered them from 
revisiting and renegotiating on their identity. In 1991, regardless of the memory of 
past identification and cultural markers, the Garri political and business elite paid 
attention to the immediate advantage of identification with the Oromo who are the 
majority in the country. They renamed their political party – the Somali Abo 
Liberation Front – in which they were better represented to become Oromo Abo 
Liberation Front. This action was part of their negotiation to be identified with the 
Oromo, a temporary switch from Somali identity that was by then facing severe 
political crisis. Though briefly, they succeeded in identifying themselves with the 
Oromo, including incorporation into the Oromia National Regional state and 
managed to control key local offices. That time the Garri emphasized common 
language and longstanding neighborliness and deemphasized the ideology of 
descent. However, after four years of ‘becoming Oromo’, and as they felt some 
frustration in their progress, and with a new political and economic opportunity 
rising on the Somali side, the Garri switched back and joined the Somali again by 
reversing the significance of the most relevant identity markers. Their 
multilingualism favored them to comfortably switch between the two categories.  
 Even a more interesting case is that of the Gabra that have a deep ethno-
historical substratum and ‘thick’ cultural features that would relate them to both 
the Oromo and Somali. As belonging to either Oromo or Somali is a factor that 
opens up opportunities in the livelihood of the people, the Gabra officials, 
businessmen, students and elders paid attention to the immediate advantage of 
identification with one of these broader ethnic groups. They identified themselves 
with the one where they perceived real or imagined advantages. Most of them 
identified themselves with the one that offered them jobs or business 
opportunities. Those who secured some opportunity in the Somali National 
Regional State claimed Somali-ness and those who got some opportunity in 
Oromia National Regional State claimed Oromo-ness. They were effectively 
divided between the two ethnicities, i.e. Oromo and Somali. Both sides co-opted 
elders who would help them in legitimizing their identity claims. Both sides are 
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busy in reconstructing politically motivated traditions and publicly performing 
them in a way they fit into their present situations. When individuals switch from 
one category to the other, which is a common practice, they just alter the 
significance of the most relevant markers.  
 
Politics of Identification, Contested Borders and Territoriality 
In my last ethnographic chapter, I have discussed how the state policies that 
equate ethnic group with administrative unit have intensified claims and counter-
claims and contestation over territory between the Oromo and Somali around their 
ethno-national regional borders, and its relation to the processes of identification 
of the Borana, Garri and Gabra. The claims include water points, tracts of land 
and pasture, ritual sites and towns. Some towns, including Moyale, even came 
under double and competing administrative structures. This contestation and 
conflict has been mirrored and explained at the local level through the conflicts 
between the Borana and the Garri who reformulated and reframed their 
longstanding competition over pastoral resources in line with the new ethno-
national administrative structures. The federal government’s activity to undertake 
referendum to determine the fate of the contested territories by majority vote 
further intertwined ethnic belonging with resources. The inhabitants were forced 
to vote for their belonging to one of these ethno-national regional states. 
Economically, the vote put the inhabitants either in a total control or in total lose 
of the resources. This had increased the role of ethnic belonging to the survival of 
the livelihood of these pastoralists and heightened the politics of identification.  
In the situation of an intensified competition and contestation between the 
Garri and the Borana at the local level and between the Somali and the Oromo in 
the national political arena, the Gabra were pressed to decide on their identity and 
show allegiance to either the Oromo or Somali. For the Gabra standing ‘betwixt 
and between’ has become difficult because they could not afford to lose the 
pastoral ground and the opportunities they would get from the state. As a result 
the division within the Gabra along the competing Oromo and Somali identity has 
been intensified.   
 
Conclusion 
The processes of identification among the Borana, Garri and Gabra, addressed in 
this dissertation, have shown to be complex, contingent, historical and politico-
economic. Identity negotiation has a limited scope constrained by pre-existing 
memories of identification, history of inter-group relation, the differential access 
to resources as well as the emerging political and economic circumstances. It is 
often motivated by the contexts in which the individuals and the collectivities find 
themselves in, under the condition of rapid socio-political change.  





The processes of identification of the Gabra and Garri have been shaped by 
several structures that condition the identity choice. These groups constructed 
their identity at the margin of several ethnic groups and states. Their earlier 
ethnogenesis was constructed at the margin of the Borana Oromo traditional 
believers and the Muslim Somali. Today, they have overlapping features taken 
from both cultures. Since the beginning of the twentieth century they have been at 
the margin of three states: Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. Presently, they find 
themselves at the margin of new actors in the political economy in Ethiopia: the 
Oromo and the Somali ethno-nationalists and their respective ethno-national 
regional states. Their ethnic identity has been constructed in a way that they could 
use a range of opportunity structures from all these ethnic groups, ethno-national 
regions and states. But at the same time they have been constrained by all these 
powerful actors.  
 
References 
Barth, Fredrik. 1969a. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston. Little, Brown 
Belete Bizuneh. 1999. "Inter-Ethnic Relation in Borana (Southern Ethiopia) A 
Historical survey to 1943. M.A Thesis Addis Ababa University  
Cornell, Stephen. 1996. The available ties that bind: content and circumstances in 
ethnic processes. In Ethnic and Racial Studies 19(2): 265-289 
Cornell, Stephen and Hartmann, Douglas. 1998. Ethnicity and race, making 
identities in a changing world. London: Pine Forge Press 
Chapman, Malcolm, et al. 1989. ‘Introduction,’ In Elizabeth Tonkin et al (eds.) 
History and ethnicity. London: Routledge  
Haberland, Eike.1963. Galla Süd-Äthiopiens. Stutgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag. 
Nagel, Joane. 1994. Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic 
Identity and Culture. Social Problems, 41 (1): 152-176 
Schlee, Günther. 2007. The Brothers of the Boran once again: on the fading 
popularity of certain Somali identities in Northern Kenya. Journal of 
Eastern African Studies. 1 (3):417-435.  
___________. 1989. Identities on the Move, Clanship and Pastoralists in Northern 
Kenya. Gideon S. Were Press, Nairobi. 
Schlee, Günther and Abdullahi A. Shongolo. 1995. Local war and its impact 
on ethnic and religious identification in southern Ethiopia. Geo Journal 36 
(1): 7- 17 
Triulzi, Alessandro. 2006. The past as contested terrain, commemorating new sites 
of memory in war-torn Ethiopia. In Preben Kaarsholm (ed) Violence, 
political culture and development in Africa. Oxford: James Curry 
 
